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Abstract. The relevance of regional policy for less favoured regions (LFRs) reveals itself when 
policy-makers must reconcile competitiveness with social cohesion through the adaptation of 
competition or innovation policies. The vast literature in this area generally builds on an overarching 
concept of ‘social capital’ as the necessary relational infrastructure for collective action 
diversification and policy integration, in a context much influenced by a dynamic of industrial change 
and a necessary balance between the creation and diffusion of ‘knowledge’ through learning. This 
relational infrastructure or ‘social capital’ is centred on people’s willingness to cooperate and 
‘envision’ futures as a result of “social organization, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate 
action and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993: 35). Advocates of this interpretation of 
‘social capital’ have adopted the ‘new growth’ thinking behind ‘systems of innovation’ and 
‘competence building’, arguing that networks have the potential to make both public administration 
and markets more effective as well as ‘learning’ trajectories more inclusive of the development of 
society as a whole. This essay aims to better understand the role of ‘social capital’ in the production 
and reproduction of uneven regional development patterns, and to critically assess the limits of a 
‘systems concept’ and an institution-centred approach to comparative studies of regional innovation. 
These aims are discussed in light of the following two assertions: i) learning behaviour, from an 
economic point of view, has its determinants, and ii) the positive economic outcomes of ‘social 
capital’ cannot be taken as a given. It is suggested that an agent-centred approach to comparative 
research best addresses the ‘learning’ determinants and the consequences of social networks on 
regional development patterns. A brief discussion of the current debate on innovation surveys has 
been provided to illustrate this point. 
 
Introduction 
Positivist interpretations of ‘vision’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘social capital’ have contributed to a diverse 
range of public and academic discourse on complex and participatory social processes, concerning 
new approaches to national and regional policy-making over the last two decades. The use of the 
terms re-emerges partially as a response to the local and regional market consequences of increasingly 
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fragmented and variable market economies. The re-emergence of ‘social capital’, in particular, is a 
direct response to this ‘new economic’ paradigm, calling for the rapid and flexible adaptation to 
adverse market conditions, and emphasizing high value-added products as the means to higher 
standards of living (Triglia, 2001:9). 
 
This perspective, also understood as “new entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 1989), consists of four 
aspects: creating jobs, expanding the local tax base, fostering small firm growth and attracting new 
forms of investment (Hall and Hubbard, 1998). It is associated with an increasing ideological view of 
the world economic order generally, which has also been specifically referred to as ‘privatism’; 
‘privatism’, though, should not be confused with ‘privatization’ (Squires, 1991).1 The ideology of 
‘privatism’ and the policies of ‘privatization,’ which have been adopted by national governments 
worldwide, constitute the transformation to entrepreneurial practices. Framed by these worldviews of 
global market dynamics, the consensus is that new and high quality products are contingent on 
innovation. 
 
The positivist interpretations of the above terms into social and economic development, though, are 
often ambiguous because of their multiple meanings or elusive connotations. Furthermore, these 
positivist interpretations contribute to the social and economic visionary discourses of the ‘European 
Project’, for example, which rest on an understanding of the world through worldviews structured on 
scientific ‘knowledge’ and its use in the rationalization of social behaviour and its causal laws 
(Taylor, 1998). 
 
Fred Polak (cited in Shipley, 2000: 228) first recognized the significance of the term ‘vision’ for the 
spatial conception of the ‘European Project’. As a part of the process for creating the European Union, 
Polak argued that all choice-oriented behaviour is contingent upon the ability to produce a clear 
mental image of events yet to come (ibid.). In fact, the Lisbon Strategy (Rodrigues, 2003, Conceição 
et al, 2003) recognizes the challenges put forth by global economic activity and the increased inter-
regional competitiveness and disparity that ‘globalization’ threatens to propagate if left unchecked. 
The strategy aims to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion” by 2010. The objective of this common ‘vision’ between Member States and the European 
Commission is to have the Lisbon Strategy serve as a benchmark for EU, national and regional 
                                                 
1 Contrary to privatism, privatization is the regulatory policy that transfers the ownership of particular industries 
or public services from the government to the private entrepreneur. In other words, this could also be viewed as 
the ‘marketization’ of public services, which ensures quality through competition. 
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policies through ‘open methods of social participation’ (i.e., participatory spatial planning processes). 
Central to the Lisbon Strategy is the recognition that various aspects of European research and 
innovation performance is continuously lagging in some areas of the EU, placing research and 
innovation policy (RTDI) at the top of the European policy agenda (EC, 2000, Edler, et al, 2003; 
Conceição et al, 2004). This follows the original reflection of Ruberti and Andre (1995), but 
represents the first serious attempt of European governments to raise science and innovation at the 
highest political level. 
 
Political ‘visions’, such as the Lisbon Strategy, have been the subject of considerable research by 
Robert Shipley (2002), who elaborates upon ‘visioning’ as ‘systems of visioning’ or “thought-out 
programs of action” in order to provide an understanding of the underlying philosophy of the term 
‘vision’ as well as the reasons why these “programs of action” fail to achieve their objectives. He first 
concludes in this most recent work that there is a lack of an underlying theory [of action] because 
every case has been designed as a step-by-step instructional guide together with general assumptions 
of the expected outcomes. Second, these ‘visioning systems’ are more promotional than an analytical 
discussion of the principles on which they are based; most of these ‘systems’ albeit proprietary. 
 
As for the meaning of ‘knowledge’, Keith Smith (2000:4) also finds that the elusiveness of the 
concept is attributed to the “very different implicit notions of knowledge”, which make it “rhetorical 
rather than analytically useful”. ‘Knowledge’ is commonly distinguished through the concepts of 
‘codified’ (disembodied) and ‘tacit’ (embodied) knowledge, but even this distinction is rather “hazy” 
according to Smith. Regardless of the term’s elusiveness, Smith suggests that it normally aims to 
reduce uncertainty, offer an explanatory structure and/or transmit data in the form of practical guides - 
similarly suggested by Shipley (2000) of ‘vision’ statements since the late 1980s. 
 
Inclusive of the ‘visions’ of social cohesion, competitiveness and sustainable economic growth in a 
leading knowledge-based economy, what challenges, then, are facing attempts at technology-based 
development and cooperation through regional policies that desire to stimulate localized learning, 
innovation and indigenous development within less-favoured regions (LFRs)? How should 
‘knowledge’ be properly linked to action? The latter question by John Friedmann (1987) is central to 
discussing technological change and the challenges to regional development, and particularly 
encouraging ‘social capital’ in LFRs. For the purposes of this essay, ‘social capital’ can impact 
economic activity in different ways. Conceived as social networks, it can facilitate inclusive and 
participatory “arenas” for action just as well as contribute to individual opportunism and exclusion. 
 5
Critical Aspects of ‘Social Capital’ and ‘Learning’ 
In order to begin to establish the critical mindset necessary for a theoretically sound discussion of 
‘social capital’ and ‘learning’, one must first absolve of the medieval English philosopher Francis 
Bacon’s renowned dictum: “knowledge is power”, whereby one acquires the knowledge to empower 
oneself competitively with the potential to undertake unmet opportunities, for one that considers the 
potential inverse relationship. Michel Foucault turns Bacon’s dictum on its head and claims, instead, 
that “power is knowledge”, implying that those who already possess power will use the knowledge of 
others to maintain their competitive position. This inverse relationship between ‘knowledge’ and 
‘power’ is clearly evident when discussed in terms of “negative social capital” (Portes, 1998: 15-18) 
and “contingent learning” (Slembeck, 1998) , which will be discussed throughout the remaining 
sections of this essay. 
 
“Toward a Renewal of Regional Systems of Innovation, RSI”? 
While much attention has been devoted to information and communication technologies, a more 
fundamental change at the start of the new millennium is the increasing importance of innovation for 
economic prosperity and the emergence of a ‘learning society’. Innovation is a broad social and 
economic activity; it transcends any specific technology, even when revolutionary, and it is manifest 
through the attitudes and behaviours of individuals oriented towards the exploitation of value-added 
change. 
 
To claim innovation as a broad social and economic activity, though, one first must have an 
understanding of the conditions for integrated ‘learning’ processes. This has led Conceição et al. 
(2003) and Conceição & Heitor (2003) to build on Lundvall & Johnson’s (1994) ‘learning economy’ 
and to discuss the ‘learning society’ in terms of innovation and competence building with social 
cohesion. They view innovation as the key process that characterizes a ‘knowledge’ economy 
understood from a dynamic perspective, where competence is the foundation from which innovation 
emerges, and which allows many innovations to be enjoyed. In other words, ‘learning’ contributes 
both to the “generation” of innovations and to the “utilization” of innovations. Conceptually, the 
founding relationship between ‘learning’ and economic growth addresses skills improvement and the 
generation, diffusion, and usage of new ideas. 
 
The inclusive “learning” ideal of the ‘learning society’, which entails a process of shared prosperity 
across the globe via local economic and social conditions, argues that it is crucial to understand the 
features of knowledge-induced growth in wealthy nations and regions, as well as the challenges and 
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opportunities for late-industrialized nations and less-favoured regions. In order to comprehend these 
features of knowledge-induced growth, it is important to recognize the relative importance of 
infrastructures and incentives, while considering the increasing significance of institutions in the 
development of ‘social capital’(Conceição, Heitor and Veloso, 2003). This is because “learning” 
societies will increasingly rely on “distributed knowledge bases”, as a systematically coherent set of 
knowledge, maintained across an economically and/or socially integrated network of agents and 
institutions.  
 
From this neoclassical economic point of view, infrastructure is related to the existing amount of 
labour, capital, and natural resources. The ‘new growth’ theories bring to stage other determinants, in 
particular human capital, and R&D expertise embodied in firms, universities, and laboratories. Thus, 
infrastructure will encompass, in addition to labour and capital, technology infrastructure, or 
technostructure. A consideration of the distinction between labour and capital on one hand, and 
technostructure on the other, enables a separate analysis of the roles played by each of these aspects in 
the development path of a particular industry or region. The ‘new growth’ theories attempt to 
formalize the way in which these ‘learning’ mechanisms can impact on economic growth. However, 
the interaction between sets of incentives and the technostruture of a particular region, industry, or 
nation fosters as well as hampers the patterns of knowledge accumulation and development. 
Nevertheless, whilst it is clear that incentives and infrastructure greatly inform our understanding of 
the behaviour of firms, government policies and industrial trajectories, they do not tell the whole story 
about the differences across countries and regions. That is, both incentives and infrastructure 
provision are shaped by individual choice behaviour (i.e., opportunism as opposed to acts of mutual 
benefit) and mobility. 
 
While it has been claimed by some researchers that regional variation exceeds that across nation-
states, thereby justifying the need to regionally address national economic development issues, others 
find that regional policies aimed at particular regions have one main weakness: scale. Oughton, et al. 
(2002: 99) argue that regional variation exceeds that of the nation states, in favour of extending the 
analysis of national systems of innovation (NSIs) to the regional scale. Hommen and Doloreux (2003) 
maintain, however, that consistent attention has been given to technology and finance resources, but 
little attention has been directed to labour, its development and deployment, all of which are easily 
supplied inter-regionally. Moreover, labour mobility reinforces the need to not only recognize the 
positive and negative impacts on development, but to consider it, among other factors, as a condition 
of the following determinants of “negative social capital” and “contingent learning”. 
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“Negative Social Capital” 
James Coleman, Mark Granovetter and Alejandro Portes illustrate that the positive-functionalist 
interpretation of ‘social capital’ does not take full consideration of the complexity of “social-
networks-and-mobility” literature (Portes, 1998:12-13). This is evident in the gender, ethnic and class 
relations-driven informal networks observed through the spatial division of labour and migration (e.g., 
immigrant entrepreneurship). Carlo Trigilia (2001) argues that a proper definition of ‘social capital’, 
in economic terms, must allow for both positive and negative networked forms of impact on local 
development. He describes how the ‘social network’ perspective, which factors in kinship, ethnicity 
and class relations, is inclusive of stratified social and economic relations, whereas the ‘cultural 
interpretation’ perspective is centred on a people’s willingness to cooperate or a “civic virtue” as the 
result of shared values and trust. Unlike the “social network” perspective systematically studied by 
Bourdieu, Loury,  Coleman and Granovetter, the “cultural interpretation”, in well-known studies by 
Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama, leaves little room for the consideration of networks of 
incivisme (uncivicness) or, as Granovetter so rightly put it, the “strength of weak ties” or informal 
networks (cited in Portes, 1998:12). Triglia (2001) reemphasizes this point by describing at some 
length the potential for “criminal economies” (e.g., the Italian Mafia), political sub-cultures, 
parochialism, etc. In order to incorporate both of these perspectives into ‘social capital’, he suggests 
that it be understood as a “network of social relations open to diverse outcomes from the economic 




Positivist-neoclassical economic assertions hold that in order for a market system to function well, the 
country or region must have “embedded” a set of social capabilities that allow it to function. This 
presupposes that the “embedded” social capabilities are competent and that the agents act in the 
collective interests of the region or nation, within their inherited institutional framework or 
jurisdiction. In other words, the assumptions are founded on a non-opportunistic and rational human 
capacity. On the contrary however, one might consider the “conditions for learning and the limits 
imposed by these conditions instead”, as suggested by Slembeck (2001:13). Slembeck draws from 
psychology’s cognitive constraints in models of bounded rationality to enrich economic analysis, 
linking the cognition and behaviour of an individual to a particular situation “by some action that 
yields consequences which feed back to the individual” and so on until individual aspiration levels are 
satisfied for the purposes of theoretical equilibrium. Brown et al. (2001) extend this discussion on 
cognitive qualities in methodological inquiry to argue for an agent-centred as opposed to an 
institution-centred approach to the comparative study between cities, regions and nations of different 
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cultures and economies. Their argument claims that “agents can and do challenge institutional 
structures”, recognizing that “individuals are conscious beings that have the capacity to think, learn, 
act and interact”. This does not deny an individual’s ability to persuade, coerce, motivate and lead, 
whereby “institutions”, manifest through social networks, can emerge from unintended human action. 
That is, to borrow from Partha Drasgrupta (2002: 30), “to identify ‘social capital’ with institutions is 
[italics added] a mistake: institutions emerge from networks, they are themselves not networks”. 
 
Brown et al. (2001) emphasize that the main difference between the two approaches is the issue of 
“autonomy”. One could argue, then, that the terrain of ‘social capital’ discourse is rather a tenuous 
relationship between “autonomy” and its corollary “subsidiarty” (Amaral, 1998: 266)2, than one solely 
founded on cooperative networks for community-wide benefit or “civicness”. By addressing the issue 
of autonomy, Brown and coleagues treat institutions as “resource endowments, providing agents with 
physical, social and intellectual resources. 
 
Compare this with Braczyk et al (eds., 1998: 12) who adopt the ‘system concept’ as the analytical 
framework for a regional comparative study of innovation. They claim that the ‘system concept’ 
requires no assumption that innovation systems always consist of closely linked actors or that they 
have clear-cut boundaries. Neither need it be anticipated that innovation systems consist of similar 
actors performing comparable [italic added] functions”. This analytical assertion is seemingly 
contradictory to Brown et al. (2002: 275), who claim that “agents in the same industries in different 
jurisdictions characterized by rather different cultural and social traditions seem to respond to 
common economic imperatives using different instruments at their disposal.” The problem here lies 
with the issue of scale and comparability. Where does one draw the boundaries? Where boundaries 
are acceptable, are the respective innovation systems comparable across the different industries for 
that jurisdiction? Instead, might one consider “national-sectoral systems of innovation” (Oosterwijk, 
2003) and/or “multi-level systems of innovation” (Kaiser and Prange, 2003)? 
 
As for the positivist neoclassical thinking noted earlier, competence is the foundation from which 
innovation emerges. Although, to what extent can a national economic development agenda, which is 
centred on regional systems of innovation and its embedded contingencies of ‘competence building’ 
and ‘social capital’, contribute to greater social cohesion as the result of interregional competition? In 
                                                 
2 “The principles of autonomy and subsidiarity imply the interpenetration of various entities that together 
constitute the State [governance] through the effective collaboration among all, and the participation of lower 
tiers in the mechanisms and decision-making processes of upper tiers in which they are integrated” (author’s 
translation). See Amaral, 1998: 266-301 for elaboration. 
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other words, to what extent is it safe to expect that a national economic development agenda, which is 
centred on competitive interregional systems of innovation initiatives, increases the chances of social 
cohesion and economic convergence for less-favoured regions? 
 
Regardless, however, Braczyk et al. and Brown et al. both seem to agree that the social networks they 
describe are socially constructed, fluid, open and dynamic. The apparent shift from “embeddedness” 
to autonomy and an agent-centred methodological approach is explored by Cooke (2004, this volume) 
through four types of ‘social capital’. Suffice to say that ‘social capital’ is the act of risk management 
between economic agents and institutions for political or economic purposes, which also is 
competitively expressed through a desire for autonomy, as opposed to one solely founded on 
cooperative networks for community-wide benefit. 
 
Behaviour, Urbanization and Industrial Localization of Innovation Activity 
The degree of local and regional development has a share of external factors impacting its capacity for 
qualified human resources and ‘social capital’, and the creation and diffusion of knowledge. These 
regional characteristics include the overall effects of population dynamics (i.e., rural-urban shift or 
urban agglomeration), and endogenous and foreign direct investment. While showing signs of some 
diffusion to other regions in the country (United Nations Secretariat, 2002), the strong urban 
orientation in Portugal, for example, persists. The significance of this seemingly growing propensity 
to agglomerate in urban areas, namely in the Lisbon and Porto Metropolitan Areas along the 
Portuguese coastal corridor, has its implications for the location decisions of Portuguese entrepreneurs 
and the national agglomeration of foreign direct investment. The spatial distribution of both forms of 
Portuguese investment has been discussed and illustrated in two separate studies (Guimarães, et al., 
2000; Figueiredo et al., 2002), which are summarized below: 
 
• Urbanization3  economies far outweigh traditional industry specific localization4 factors (e.g., 
labour and land costs); “urban diversity economies, not industry localization, drives economic 
growth according to [the] ‘new economic geography’”. Whereby urbanization economies 
offset “information costs”;5 
                                                 
3 The increase and development of urban services (e.g., housing, hotel, leisure, food and retail) 
 
4 The localization or the attraction of new economic activity to an area’s existing cluster of economic 
concentration (local knowledge, skilled workforce, etc.); “specialization attracts more specialization” 
 




• “Information costs” and available services to foreign investors, due to unfamiliar environment 
(local laws, customs, taxes, etc.), remain a key issue for agglomeration along the coastal 
corridor, followed by industry-level localization factors (e.g., percentage of skilled 
workforce); and 
• “Informational cascading”: despite comparable advantages in less urbanized neighbouring 
regions, firms continue to migrate to cities, imitating previous location decisions. Most 
entrepreneurs invest in their previous area of economic activity, apparently paying a premium 
to compete in their “home” territory; study shows that these “home” investors are willing to 
pay up to 3.4 times what could be paid out in wage costs elsewhere in the country (whether, 
the dense concentration of entrepreneurial investment is simply the tendency of Portuguese 
entrepreneurs to invest in their “home” territories, or their increased need in skilled labour 
versus the low-wage labour pools of peripheral regions is not clear). 
 
Albeit, Portuguese peripheral regions provide no evidence that their less expensive labour costs have 
influenced location. The studies even suggest that public transport policy might influence this finding 
in favour of the peripheral regions, since distance to peripheral cities remains an important factor. 
More importantly noted, however, is that the strong urban orientation, which is centred on the 
metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, seemingly goes beyond the traditional explanations of 
localization and urbanization agglomeration economies to one of strong endogenous social networks. 
This is particularly apparent in explaining the behaviour of investors willing to pay up to 3.4 times 
what could be paid in wage costs elsewhere in the country. Both studies elude to but do not discuss 
the social networks behind these patterns of industrial localization (i.e., extend the discussion from the 
linear cause and effect explanations of neoclassical economics to the complex interdependencies of 
social networks embedded in areas of previous economic activity or previous location decisions); 
suffice to say that the authors of both studies claim urbanization agglomeration has driven the location 
of entrepreneurial investment, as opposed to industrial localization agglomeration economies. 
 
One could draw from these studies the argument that geography and institutions matter! How to study 
‘social capital’ in the context of these development patterns, though, is uncertain, particularly for 
imitative firm behaviour or norms, or where institutions have seemingly failed to provide the 
necessary endowments to encourage or minimize the risk economic agents would incur otherwise. 
Using ‘social capital’ in these circumstances must be exercised with some caution because its 
definition(s) tends to be elusive and generally interpreted with functionalist or causal links to 
economic growth, for instance. Although, due to ‘social capital’s’ context specificity or the agent-
centred contingencies discussed above (i.e., ‘negative social capital’ and ‘contingent learning’), 
policy implications remain unclear and its measurement difficult; limit the study of ‘social capital’ to 
the rationalization of its positive effects is a mistake, or, at the very least, a misleading representation 
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of the social construction of [new] technology or the innovation process. It also is apparent, then, that 
history matters. In the light of both organizational and technological innovation development, which 
comes first? The “debate on innovation surveys” raises a number of critical questions in this respect 
(Conceição and Heitor, 2003). 
 
Measuring the ‘Social Capital’ of Innovation Activity 
For Mónica Salazar and Adam Holbrook (2003), the critical questions concerning the debate on 
innovation surveys are structured according to five conceptual and methodological dichotomies that 
include issues centred on ‘unit of [innovation] analysis’, ‘levels of novelty’ or degree of 
innovativeness, ‘potentially innovative firms’ as a third category response to innovation in developing 
countries (first and second being innovative and non-innovative firms), public vs. private sector 
innovation, and the social and geographic dimension of innovation. The authors provide an historical 
review of innovation surveys or questionnaires that begin with the conceptual framework for 
innovation indicators in 1988, which was revised a year later in Oslo, Norway (Oslo Manual), and 
contributed to the launch of the first European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in 1991 and 
subsequent versions in 1997 and 2001. 
 
Their main argument holds that the questionnaires based on the Oslo Manual use the systems of 
innovation approach, but they collect little information on the dynamic of such systems. The argument 
is discussed in accordance with the principles of the recently published Bogatá Manual, which is 
structured on a broader definition of innovation that includes organizational and technological 
innovation as well as its commercialization. The Bogatá Manual stands in direct opposition to the 
innovative firm focus of the Oslo Manual whereby surveys are more geared to the ‘process of 
innovation’, rather than solely aimed at quantifying the ‘results of innovation’ (e.g., the bias toward 
technology producing innovation). 
 
Moreover, Salazar and Holbrook (2003: 11) direct some attention to the Canadian ISRN6 survey, 
which, unlike traditional innovation surveys that aim to characterize innovation activities at the firm 
level, attempts to characterize networks of ‘differential relationships’ between local and non-local 
agents in a seemingly agent-centred approach. While CIS III accounts for the collaborative tendencies 
and organizational changes of firms, the authors find they are not investigated as activities directly 
linked to innovation, but potential correlations of innovative firm behaviour worthy of analysis. They 
point out the lack of location data useful to cluster studies, such as that of the Canadian ISRN survey, 
and the embedded social structures and social roles that determine the power of an individual in the 
workplace and, thereby, the type of innovation one participates in across different industry sectors and 
                                                 
6 Innovation Systems Research Network 
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throughout different nations. Such is the potential ‘gender-bias’ of methodological approaches, for 
example, that do not undertake a gender-inclusive dimension in the measurement of innovation, 
concerning syntheses on collaborative vs. radical, individualistic innovative actions. 
 
Conclusion 
From this essay one may conclude that the study and understanding of non-innovative behaviour 
and/or innovation failures (i.e., negative social capital), which potentially add to the individual tacit 
knowledge that contributes to workplace productivity (i.e., contingent learning), is equally as 
important as the multi-dimensional considerations of innovation measurement methodologies. 
However, one must also conclude that an albeit exhaustive understanding of innovation goes beyond 
the firm focus of traditional innovation surveys to one inclusive of social and geographic as well as 
economic dimensions of an agent-centred approach. Methodological approaches, then, must 
understand the “object” of innovation surveys to be an investigation of the determinants of successful 
and non-successful innovation processes, as opposed to solely understanding these surveys as the 
measurement of the “results” of innovative actions (e.g., technology producing processes). The 
“subject” of such surveys is the differential relationships between local and non-local agents; and only 
in this way is it possible to appreciate the critical aspects of ‘social capital’ and ‘learning’ in 
innovation processes. 
 
Moreover, there is no definitive answer(s) to the problem of achieving ‘learning’ societies. As in 
every situation where institutions are important, history and geography ought to be of equal or greater 
concern. Path dependence and increasing returns lead to self-reinforcing cycles, whereby events, often 
sporadic and serendipitous, define current patterns of development (good and bad). The good news is 
that if one understands the dynamics of institutional change through an agent-centred approach and 
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